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ON CAPITAL ALLOCATION
BY MINIMIZING MULTIVARIATE RISK INDICATORS
V. MAUME-DESCHAMPS, D. RULLIÈRE, AND K. SAID
Abstract. The issue of capital allocation in a multivariate context arises from the presence of
dependence between the various risky activities which may generate a diversification effect. Several
allocation methods in the literature are based on a choice of a univariate risk measure and an
allocation principle, others on optimizing a multivariate ruin probability or some multivariate risk
indicators. In this paper, we focus on the latter technique. Using an axiomatic approach, we study
its coherence properties. We give some explicit results in mono periodic cases. Finally we analyze
the impact of the dependence structure on the optimal allocation.
Introduction
The calculation of the regulatory economic capital, which is called the Solvency Capital Require-
ment in insurance, is well controlled and its methodology is almost imposed by the supervisory
authorities of the sector. Nevertheless, the allocation of this capital may be considered as an inter-
nal exercise for each company, and constitutes a management choice whose success is a key factor
for firm performance optimization. It can also be seen as an indicator of its good governance,
especially for the multi branches firms.
The literature on the subject of the capital allocation methods is very rich. Several principles
have been proposed over the last twenty years, the most important and most studied are the Shap-
ley method, the Aumann-Shapley method and the Euler’s method.
The Shapley method is based on cooperative game theory. It is described in detail in Denault’s
paper (2001) [11], where it is proved that this method, originally used to allocate the total cost
between players in coalitional games context, can be easily adapted to solve problem of the overall
risk allocation between segments.
Tasche devoted two papers [24] and [25], to the description of the Euler method, which is also
found in the literature under the name of the gradient method. Euler method is based on the
idea of allocating capital according to the infinitesimal marginal impact of each risk. This impact
corresponds to the increase obtained on the overall risk, yielding an infinitely small increment in
the risk i. The Euler method is very present in the literature, several papers analyze its properties
(RORAC compatibility [7], [27], Coherence [6],...) under different assumptions (Tasche (2004) [23],
Balog (2011) [3]). Its fame is due to the existence of economic arguments that can justify its use
to develop allocation rules.
Finally, Aumann-Shapley method is a continuous generalization of Shapley method, its principle
is based on the value introduced by Aumann and Shaplay in game theory. Denault [11] analyzes
this method and its application to capital allocation.
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These three capital allocation principles rely on different risk measures, and the coherence of
the allocation method depends on the properties of the selected risk measure. Several papers deal
with capital allocation coherence based on the properties of the risk measure used, we quote as
examples, Fischer (2003) [13], Bush and Dorfleitner (2008) [6], and Kalkbrener (2009) [17].
Other techniques have been proposed more recently for building optimal allocation methods,
by minimizing some multivariate ruin probabilities, especially those defined by Cai and Li (2007)
[8], or by minimizing some new multivariate risk indicators. In this context, Cénac et al [9], [10]
defined three types of indicators, which take into account both the ruin severity at the branch level,
and the impact of the dependence structure on this local severity. In the one-period case, these
indicators can be considered as special cases of a general indicator family introduced in Dhaene et
al (2012) [12].
Allocation by minimization of some real multivariate risk indicators can be used in a more gen-
eral framework for modeling systemic risk, and also to determine the priorities of optimal stop-loss
treaties that a reinsurer can offer according to the risk portfolios of its insurer customers, knowing
that he covers his overall portfolio with a Stop-Loss treaty of priority u. This allocation technique
can also help to measure the performance of calculating the groups capital requirement in the
Swiss Solvency Test (SST), which provides a consistent framework both for legal branches and
group solvency capital requirement.
The article is organized as follows. The first section is devoted to some definitions and notations
that will be used throughout the rest of the article. Next, we study the coherence properties of
the allocation by minimization of some specific indicators, and for a general choice of the penalties
functions in Section 2. Section 3 is a presentation of some explicit formulas obtained for special
model cases, the asymptotic behavior of the optimal allocation is also discussed in this section.
In Section 4, we treat the question of the impact of the dependence structure on the composition
of the optimal allocation, through the analysis of comonotonic cases and using some models of
bivariate dependence with copulas.
1. Optimal allocation
In a multivariate risk framework, we consider a vectorial risk process Xp = (Xp1 , . . . , Xpd), where
Xpk corresponds to the losses of the kth business line during the pth period. We denote by Rkp the
reserve of the kth line at time p, so: Rkp = uk −
p∑
l=1
X lk, where uk ∈ R+ is the initial capital of the
kth business line, then u = u1 + · · ·+ ud is the initial capital of the group, and d is the number of
business lines.
Cénac et al (2012) [10] defined the two following multivariate risk indicators, given penalty func-
tions gk:
• the indicator I:
I (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
 n∑
p=1
gk(Rkp)1 {Rkp<0}1 {∑d
j=1R
j
p>0}
,
• the indicator J :
J (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
 n∑
p=1
gk(Rkp)1 {Rkp<0}1 {∑d
j=1R
j
p<0}
,
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gk : R− → R+ are C1, convex functions with gk(0) = 0, gk(x) ≥ 0 for x < 0, k = 1, . . . , d. They
represent the cost that each branch has to pay when it becomes insolvent while the group is solvent
for the I indicator, or while the group is also insolvent in the case of the J indicator.
They proposed to allocate some capital u by minimizing these indicators. The idea is to find an
allocation vector (u1, . . . , ud) that minimizes the indicator such as u = u1 + · · · + ud, where u is
the initial capital that need to be shared among all branches.
The indicator I represents the expected sum of penalty amounts of local ruins, knowing that
the group remains solvent. In the case of the indicator J , the local ruin severities are taken into
account only in the case of group insolvency.
By using optimization stochastic algorithms, we may estimate the minimum of these risk indica-
tors. Cénac et al (2012) [10] propose a Kiefer-Wolfowitz version of mirror algorithm as a convergent
algorithm under general assumptions to find optimal allocation minimizing the indictor I. This
algorithm is effective to solve the optimal allocation problem, especially, for a large number of
business lines, and for allocation over several periods.
1.1. Definitions and notations. In this paper, we focus on the case of allocations on a single
period (n = 1), since new regulation rules, such as Solvency 2, requires a justified allocation over
a period of one year, and also to make a first computational approach, knowing that an annual
allocation will be a more efficient choice for an insurer, that will allow it to integrate the changes
that occurred at its risk portfolio and its dependence structure during a year of operation.
The following notations are used:
 The risk Xk corresponds to the losses of the kth branch during one period. It is a positive
random variable in our context.
 u is the initial capital of the firm.
 Udu = {v = (v1, . . . , vd) ∈ [0, u]d,
∑d
i=1 vi = u} is the set of possible allocations. We define
an allocation as an application R+ → (R+)d.
 For all i ∈ {1, . . . , d} let αi = uiu , then,
∑d
i=1 αi = 1.
 1 du = {α = (α1, . . . , αd) ∈ [0, 1]d,
∑d
i=1 αi = 1} is the set of possible allocation percentages
αi = ui/u.
 For (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ Udu , we define the reserve of the kth business line at the end of the period
is: Rk = uk −Xk, where uk represents the part of capital allocated to the kth branch.
 The aggregate sum of risks is: S = ∑di=1Xi, and let S−i = ∑dj=1;j 6=iXj for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
 FZ is the distribution function of a random variable Z, F¯Z is its survival function and fZ
its density function.
Definition 1.1 (Optimal allocation:). Let X be a positive random vector of Rd, u ∈ R+ and
KX : Udu → R+ a multivariate risk indicator associated to X and u. An optimal allocation is
defined by:
(u1, . . . , ud) ∈ arg inf
(v1,...,vd)∈Udu
{KX(v1, . . . , vd)} .
For risk indicators of the form KX(v) = E[S(X, v)], for a scoring function S : R+d × R+d → R+,
this definition can be seen as an extension in a multivariate framework of the elicitability concept.
Elicitability has been introduced by Gneiting (2011)[15], and studied recently for univariate risk
measures, by Bellini and Bignozzi (2013)[4], Ziegel (2014)[28] and Steinwart et al (2014)[22], for
examples.
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We denote by AX1,...,Xd(u) = (u1, . . . , ud), the optimal allocation of the amount u on the d risky
branches in Udu .
Assumptions: Throughout this paper, we will use the following assumptions:
H1: The risk indicator admits an unique minimum in Udu .
H2: The functions gk are differentiable and such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, g′k(uk − Xk)
admits a moment of order one, and (Xk, S) has a joint density distribution denoted by
f(Xk,S).
H3: The d risks have the same penalty function gk = g,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
The first assumption is verified when the indicator is strictly convex, this is particularly true when
for at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, gk is strictly convex; and the joint density f(Xk,S) support contains
[0, u]2 (see [10]).
1.2. Coherence properties. In his article [11], Denault introduced the notion of a coherent al-
location, fixing four axioms that must be verified by a principle of capital allocation, driven by
coherent univariate risk measures, according to the criteria defined by Artzner et al (1999) [1],
in order to be qualified as coherent. Our optimal capital allocation is not directly derived from
a univariate risk measure, even if it is obtained by minimizing a multivariate risk indicator, we
reformulate coherence axioms in our context.
1.2.1. Coherence. We follow Denault’s idea to define a coherent capital allocation.
Definition 1.2 (Coherence). A capital allocation (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ R+d of an initial capital u ∈ R+
is coherent if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Full allocation: All of the capital u ∈ R+ must be allocated between the branches:
d∑
i=1
ui = u.
2. Symmetry: If the joint distribution of the vector (X1, . . . , Xd) is unchanged by permuta-
tion of the risksXi andXj, then the allocation remains also unchanged by this permutation,
and the ith and jth business lines both make the same contribution to the risk capital:
(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi, Xi+1 . . . , Xj−1, Xj, Xj+1, . . . , Xd) L= (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xj, Xi+1 . . . , Xj−1, Xi, Xj+1, . . . , Xd),
then ui = uj.
3. Riskless allocation: For a deterministic risk X = c, where the constant c ∈ R+:
AX,X1,...,Xd(u) = (c, AX1,...,Xd(u− c)).
This property means that the optimal allocation method relates only risky branches, the
presence of a deterministic risk has no impact on the share allocated to the risky branches.
4. Sub-additivity: ∀M ⊆ {1, . . . , d}, let (u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗r) = A∑
i∈M Xi,Xj∈{1,...,d}\M
(u), where
r = d− card(M) and (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u):
u∗ ≤ ∑
i∈M
ui.
This property mains that the optimal allocation takes into account the diversification gain.
It is related to the no undercut property defined by Denault, which has no sense in our
context.
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5. Comonotonic additivity: For r 6 d comonotonic risks,
AXii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CRXk
(u) = (uii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CR
uk),
where (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) is the optimal allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xd)
and CR denote the set of the r comonotonic risk indexes.
The concept of comonotonic random variables is related to the studies of Hoeffding (1940)
[16] and Fréchet (1951) [14]. Here we use the definition of comonotonic risks as it was first
mentioned in the actuarial literature in Borch (1962) [5].
1.2.2. Other desirable properties. We define also some desirable properties that an optimal allo-
cation must naturally satisfy. These properties are based on the ideas presented by Artzner et
al (1999) [1] for coherent risk measures and on the axiomatic characterization of coherent capital
allocations given by Kalkbrener (2009) [17].
Definition 1.3 (Positive homogeneity). An optimal allocation is positively homogeneous, if for
any α ∈ R+, it satisfies:
AαX1,...,αXd(αu) = αAX1,...,Xd(u).
In other words, a capital allocation method is positively homogeneous, if it is insensitive to the
cash changes.
Definition 1.4 (Translation invariance). An optimal allocation is invariant by translation, if for
all (a1, . . . , ad) ∈ Rd, it satisfies:
AX1−a1,...,Xd−ad(u) = AX1,...,Xd
(
u+
d∑
k=1
ak
)
− (a1, . . . , ad).
The translation invariance property shows that the impact of an increase (decrease) of a risk by
a constant amount of its share of allocation of the capital u, boils down to an increase (decrease)
of its share in the allocation of such capital decreased (increased) by the same amount.
Definition 1.5 (Continuity). An optimal allocation is continuous, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
lim
→0AX1,...,(1+)Xi,...,Xd(u) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u).
This property reflects the fact that a small change to the risk of a business line, have only limited
effect on the capital part that we attribute to it.
Let’s recall the definition of the order stochastic dominance, as it is presented in Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007)[21]. For random variables X and Y , Y first-order stochastically dominates
X if and only if:
F¯X(x) ≤ F¯Y (x), ∀x ∈ R+,
and in this case we denote: X ≤st Y .
This definition is also equivalent to the following one:
X ≤st Y ⇔ E[u(X)] ≤ E[u(Y )], for all u increasing function
Definition 1.6 (Monotonicity). An optimal allocation satisfies the monotonicity property, if for
(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2:
Xi ≤st Xj ⇒ ui ≤ uj.
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The monotonicity is a natural requirement, it reflects the fact that if a branch Xj is riskier than
branch Xi. Then, it is natural to allocate more capital to the risk Xj.
The RORAC compatibility property defined by Dirk Tasche [24] loses its meaning in absence of
the risk measure used in the construction of the allocation method.
1.3. Optimality conditions. In this section, we focus on the optimality condition for the indi-
cators I and J .
For an initial capital u, and an optimal allocation minimizing the multivariate risk indicator I, we
seek u∗ ∈ Rd+ such that:
I (u∗) = inf
v1+···+vd=u
I (v), v ∈ Rd+.
Under assumption H2, the risk indicators I and J are differentiable, and in this case, we can
calculate the following gradients:
(∇I(v))i =
d∑
k=1
∫ +∞
vk
gk(vk − x)fXk,S(x, u)dx+ E[g′i(vi −Xi)1 {Xi>vi}1 {S≤u}]
and, (∇J(v))i =
d∑
k=1
∫ +∞
vk
gk(vk − x)fXk,S(x, u)dx+ E[g′i(vi −Xi)1 {Xi>vi}1 {S≥u}].
Under H1 and H2, using the Lagrange multipliers method, we obtain an optimality condition
verified by the unique solution to this optimization problem:
(1.1) E[g′i(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g′i(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}2.
A natural choice for penalty functions is the ruin severity: gk(x) = |x|. In that case, and if the joint
density f(Xk,S) support contains [0, u]2, for at least one k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, our optimization problem
has a unique solution.
We may write the indicators as follows:
I (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
|Rk|1 {Rk<0}1 {∑d
i=1R
i≥0}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {∑d
i=1Xi≤u}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)+1 {S≤u}
)
,
and,
J (u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
|Rk|1 {Rk<0}1 {∑d
i=1R
i≤0}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {∑d
i=1Xi≥u}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)+1 {S≥u}
)
.
The respective components of the gradient of these indicators are of the form:
KI − P
X1 > u1, d∑
j=1
Xj ≤ u
 , . . . , KI − P
Xd > ud, d∑
j=1
Xj ≤ u
 ,
and,
KJ − P
X1 > u1, d∑
j=1
Xj ≥ u
 , . . . , KJ − P
Xd > ud, d∑
j=1
Xj ≥ u
 ,
6
where,
KI = KJ =
d∑
k=1
∫ +∞
uk
(x− uk)fXk,S(x, u)dx.
Using the Lagrange multipliers to solve our convex optimization problem under the only constraint
u1 +u2 + · · ·+ud = u, the following optimality conditions are obtained from 1.1 in the special case
where gk(x) = |x|:
(1.2) P (Xi > ui, S ≤ u) = P (Xj > uj, S ≤ u) ,∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2.
For the J indicator, this condition can be written:
(1.3) P (Xi > ui, S ≥ u) = P (Xj > uj, S ≥ u) ,∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2.
Some explicit and semi-explicit formulas for the optimal allocation can be obtained with this op-
timality condition. Our problem reduces to the study of this allocation depending on the nature
of the distributions of the risk Xk and on the form of dependence between them.
1.4. Main theoretical results. In section 2, we shall prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.7. In the case of penalty functions gk(x) = |x| ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and for continuous
random vector (X1, . . . , Xd), such that the joint density f(Xk,S) support contains [0, u]2, for at least
one k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the optimal allocation by minimization of the indicators I and J is a symmetric
riskless full allocation. It satisfies the properties of comonotonic additivity, positive homogeneity,
translation invariance, monotonicity, and continuity.
The main theoretical result of section 3 is Theorem 3.7, from which the asymptotic (as u→ +∞)
behavior of the optimal allocation may be derived for large classes of independent distributions.
2. Properties of the optimal allocation method
In what follows, we show that the capital allocation minimizing the indicator I, satisfies the
coherence axioms of Definition 1.2, except the sub-additivity. We show also that it satisfies other
desirable properties in the second subsection. The same holds for the indicator J .
2.1. Coherence. Firstly, the full allocation axiom is verified by construction, since any optimal
allocation satisfies the equality:
d∑
i=1
ui = u.
Proposition 2.1 shows that the optimal allocation satisfies the symmetry property.
Proposition 2.1 (Symmetry). Under H1, if for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2, i 6= j, the couples
(Xi, S−i) and (Xj, S−j) are identically distributed and the penalty functions gi and gj are the
same gi = gj, then:
ui = uj.
Proof. Let (i 6= j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2 be such that (Xi, S−i) and (Xj, S−j) have the same distribution
and the same penalty function gi = gj = g. If ui 6= uj, we may assume i < j, and denote:
(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xj ,...,Xd(u),
then,
I(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud) = inf
v∈Udu
I (v) = inf
v∈Udu
d∑
k=1
E
(
gk(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u}
)
.
7
On the other hand, and since gi = gj = g and (Xi, S−i) ∼ (Xj, S−j), then:
I(u1, . . . , ui−1, uj, ui+1, . . . , uj−1, ui, uj+1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1,k 6=i,k 6=j
E
(
gk(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u}
)
+ E
(
g(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}
)
+ E
(
g(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}
)
= I(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud).
From H1, the indicator I admits an unique minimum in Udu , we deduce that:
(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uj, . . . , ud) = (u1, . . . , ui−1, uj, ui+1, . . . , uj−1, ui, uj+1, . . . , ud).
We conclude that ui = uj . 
Corollary 2.2. Under Assumptions H1 and H3, if (X1, . . . , Xd) is an exchangeable random vector,
then the allocation by minimizing I and J indicators is the same and is given by:
AX1,...,Xd(u) =
(
u
d
,
u
d
, . . . ,
u
d
)
.
The following proposition shows that the optimal allocation verifies the Riskless allocation axiom.
Proposition 2.3 (Riskless Allocation). Under Assumptions H1 and H3, and for 1-homogeneous
penalty functions, for any c ∈ R:
Ac,X1,...,Xd(u) = (c, AX1,...,Xd(u− c)),
where (c, AX1,...,Xd(u− c)) is the concatenated vector of c and the vector AX1,...,Xd(u− c).
Proof. The presence of a discrete distribution makes the indicator I not differentiable, so we cannot
use neither the gradient, nor the optimality condition obtained in the case of existence of joined
densities.
Let, (u∗, u∗1, · · · , u∗d) = Ac,X1,...,Xd(u) and (u1, · · · , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u− c).
We denote S = ∑di=1Xi, and the common penalty function g = gk,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the function g
is convex on R− and g(0) = 0, we deduce that g is also positively homogeneous.
We distinguish between three possibilities:
• Case 1: u∗ < c
In this case,
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) = inf
v∈Ud+1u
I (v) = inf
v∈Ud+1u
d∑
k=0
E
(
g(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
= E
(
g(u∗ − c)1 {S≤u−c}
)
+
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d} we put, for example, αk = α = u∗−cd < 0, and since the function g is
convex and g(0) = 0, it satisfies for all real 0 < β < 1, g(βx) ≤ βg(x),∀x ∈ R−. Then:
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) ≥ E
(
d · g
(
u∗ − c
d
)
1 {S≤u−c}
)
+
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
= E
(
d · g (−(−α)+) 1 {S≤u−c}
)
+
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − u∗k)+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
[g(−(Xk − u∗k)+) + g(−(−αk)+)]1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
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x→ g(−(x)+) is also a 1-homogeneous convex function, then:
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) ≥
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − (u∗k + αk))+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
we remark that ∑dk=1(u∗k + αk) = u− c, then (u∗1 + α, . . . , u∗d + α) ∈ Udu−c.
So,
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) ≥
d∑
k=1
E
(
g((u∗k + αk)−Xk))1 {Xk>u∗k+αk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
≥ inf
v∈Udu−c
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(uk −Xk)+1 {S≤u−c}
)
= I(c, u1, . . . , ud),
then,
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) ≥ I(c, u1, . . . , ud).
That is contradictory with the uniqueness of the minimum on the set Ud+1u .
• Case 2: u∗ > c
We have :
I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
,
and,
I(c, u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
.
Let α = u∗−c
d
> 0, we remark that,(u∗1+α, . . . , u∗d+α) ∈ Udu−c, and that the penalty function
g is decreasing on R− because g′′(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ R− and g′(0+) = 0. Then,
I(c, u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − uk)+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
= inf
v∈Udu−c
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(vk −Xk)1 {Xk>vk}1 {S≤u−c}
)
≤
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − (u∗k + α))+)1 {S≤u−c}
)
<
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(−(Xk − u∗k))+1 {S≤u−c}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
g(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u−c}
)
= I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d).
That is contradictory with the fact that I(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) = inf
v∈Ud+1u
I (v).
We deduce that the only possible case is the third one u∗ = c.
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• Case 3: u∗ = c
The uniqueness of the minimum implies that:
(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) = (c, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) = arg min
Ud+1u
d∑
k=1
E[g(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u−c}]
= arg min
Udu−c
d∑
k=1
E[g(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u−c}]
= (c, u1, . . . , ud).
Finally, we have proven that:
(u∗, u∗1, . . . , u∗d) = (c, u1, . . . , ud).

Lemma 2.4 is related to the sub-additivity property. It will be used in the proof of the comono-
tonic additivity property.
Lemma 2.4. Under Assumptions H1,H2 and H3, and For all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2, and where, x.ei
is the dot product of the vector x ∈ Rd and the ith component of the canonical basis of Rd.
• if AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ei < AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej), then:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ i, j, AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ek > AX1,...,Xd(u).ek,
• if AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ei > AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej), then:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ i, j, AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ek < AX1,...,Xd(u).ek,
• if AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ei = AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej), then:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ i, j, AX1,...,Xi−1,Xi+Xj ,Xi+1,...,Xj−1,Xj+1,...,Xd(u).ek = AX1,...,Xd(u).ek.
Proof. In order to simplify the notation, and without loss of generality, we assume i = d − 1 and
j = d. We put,(u1, . . . , ud−1, ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) and (u∗1, . . . , u∗d−2, u∗d−1) = AX1,...,Xd−2,Xd−1+Xd(u).
The optimality condition for (u1, . . . , ud−1, ud) is given ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2 by equation 1.1:
E[g′i(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g′i(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}] = λ,
and for (u∗1, . . . , u∗d−2, u∗d−1) is ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 2}
E[g′i(u∗i −Xi)1 {Xi>u∗i }1 {S≤u}] = E[g′i(u∗d−1 − (Xd−1 +Xd))1 {Xd+Xd−1>u∗d−1}1 {S≤u}] = λ∗.
Now, we suppose that u∗d−1 > ud + ud−1. In this case there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , d − 2} such that
u∗k < uk, and since the function x→ g′(−(x)+) is decreasing on R+, then:
E[g′i(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u}] = λ < E[g′i(u∗k −Xk)1 {Xk>u∗k}1 {S≤u}] = λ∗
we deduce from this that for all k ∈ 1, . . . , d− 2 : u∗k < uk.
The proof is the same if we suppose that u∗d−1 < ud + ud−1, and the additive case is a corollary of
the two previous ones. 
Proposition 2.5 (Comonotonic additivity). Under Assumption H2, and for gk(x) = |x|, for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, if r ≤ d risks Xii∈CR are comonotonics, then:
AXii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CRXk
(u) = (uii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CR
uk),
where (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) is the optimal allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xd),
AXii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CRXk
(u) is the optimal allocation of u on the n−d+1 risks (Xii∈{1,...,d}\CR ,
∑
k∈CRXk),
and CR denote the set of the r comonotonic risk indexes.
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Proof. For (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2, if Xi and Xj are comonotonic risks, then, there exists an increasing
non negative function h such that Xi = h(Xj), and we remark that h is strictly increasing under
Assumption H2. Let f be the function x→ f(x) = x+ h(x), so that Xi +Xj = f(Xj).
We denote (u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xd(u) and (u∗1, . . . , u∗d−1) = AXi∈{1,...,d}\{i,j},Xi+Xj (u), then,
AXi∈{1,...,d}\{i,j},Xi+Xj (u).ed−1 = u
∗
d−1 and AX1,...,Xd(u).(ei + ej) = ui + uj.
From the optimality condition for the allocation AX1,...,Xd(u), given in Equation 1.2:
P(Xi ≥ ui, S ≤ u) = P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≤ u),
we deduce that ui = h(uj) and that ui + uj = f(uj).
If there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j}, such that u∗k < uk, then ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j}:
P(Xk ≥ u∗k, S ≤ u) > P(Xk ≥ uk, S ≤ u),
so,
P(Xi +Xj ≥ u∗d−1, S ≤ u) = P(Xj ≥ f−1(u∗d−1), S ≤ u)
= P(Xk ≥ u∗k, S ≤ u)
> P(Xk ≥ uk, S ≤ u)
= P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≤ u),
finally, we deduce that: f−1(u∗d−1) < uj, then u∗d−1 < f(uj) = ui + uj and,∑
k∈{1,...,d}\{i,j} u∗k <
∑
k∈{1,...,d}\{i,j} uk which is absurd.
In the same way, the case uk < u∗k for k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j} leads to the contradiction.
Using Lemma 2.4, and under Assumption H3, we deduce the optimal allocation for the other risks
Xk, k ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {i, j}.
The additivity property for two comonotonic risks is trivially generalizable to several comonotonic
risks. 
Concerning the sub-additivity property, we have not yet managed to build a demonstration for
this property. However, the simulations using the optimization algorithm presented in Cénac et
al (2012) [10], seem to confirm the sub-additivity of the allocation by minimizing the indicators I
and J , even for classic examples of non sub-additivity of the risk measure VaR.
Remark 2.6. The previous properties have been demonstrated for the optimal allocation by min-
imizing the risk indicator I, they can be demonstrated with the same arguments for the optimal
allocation by minimization of the indicator J .
2.2. Other desirable properties. In this section, we show that the optimal allocation by mini-
mization of the indicators I and J satisfies some desirable properties. We consider the allocation
by minimizing the multivariate risk indicator I, the demonstrations are almost the same in the
case of the indicator J .
The following proposition shows that the optimal allocation by minimization indicators I and
J satisfies the property of positive homogeneity.
Proposition 2.7 (Positive homogeneity). Under Assumption H1, and for 1-homogeneous penalty
functions gk, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, for any α ∈ R+:
AαX1,...,αXd(αu) = αAX1,...,Xd(u).
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Proof. Since the penalty functions are convex and 1-homogeneous, then, for any α ∈ R∗+ :
AαX1,...,αXd(αu) = arg min
(u∗1,...,u∗d)∈Udαu
d∑
k=1
E[gk(u∗k − αXk)1 {αXk>u∗k}1 {αS≤αu}]
= arg min
(u∗1,...,u∗d)∈Udαu
d∑
k=1
αE[gk
(
u∗k
α
−Xk
)
1
{Xk>
u∗
k
α
}
1 {S≤u}]
= arg min
(u∗1,...,u∗d)∈Udαu
d∑
k=1
E[gk
(
u∗k
α
−Xk
)
1
{Xk>
u∗
k
α
}
1 {S≤u}]
= α arg min
(u1,...,ud)∈Udu
d∑
k=1
E[gk(uk −Xk)1 {Xk>uk}1 {S≤u}]
= αAX1,...,Xd(u).

Proposition 2.8 (Translation invariance). Under Assumptions H1, H2 and for all (a1, . . . , ad) ∈
Rd, such that the joint density f(Xk, S) support contains [0, u+
∑d
k=1 ak]2, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
AX1−a1,...,Xd−ad(u) = AX1,...,Xd
(
u+
d∑
k=1
ak
)
− (a1, . . . , ad).
Proof. We denote by (u∗1, . . . , u∗d) the optimal allocation AX1−a1,...,Xd−ad(u), and by (u1, . . . , ud) the
optimal allocation AX1,...,Xd
(
u+∑dk=1 ak).
Using the optimality condition (1.1), (u∗1, . . . , u∗d) is the unique solution in Udu of the following
equation system:
E[g′i(u∗i−(Xi−ai))1 {Xi−ai>u∗i }1 {S−a≤u}] = E[g′j(u∗j−(Xj−aj))1 {Xj−aj>u∗j}1 {S−a≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
where a = ∑dk=1 ak. Then, (u∗1, . . . , u∗d) satisfies also:
E[g′i(u∗i +ai−Xi)1 {Xi>u∗i+ai}1 {S≤u+a}] = E[g′i(u∗i +aj−Xj)1 {Xj>u∗j+ai}1 {S≤u+a}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Since, (u∗1 + a1, . . . , u∗d + ad) ∈ Udu+a, and from the solution uniqueness of the optimality condi-
tion (1.1) for the allocation AX1,...,Xd (u+ a), we deduce that: u∗k+ak = uk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , d}. 
Proposition 2.9 (Continuity). Under Assumptions H1 and H2, and if ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ∃0 > 0
such that:
∀, || < 0, E[ sup
v∈[0,u]
|g′k(v − (1 + )Xk)|] < +∞,
then, if (X1, . . . , Xd) is a continuous random vector, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}:
lim
→0AX1,...,(1+)Xi,...,Xd(u) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u).
Proof. Let (u1, . . . , ud) be the optimal allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xd):
(u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u),
then (u1, . . . , ud) is the unique solution in Udu of Equation system (1.1):
E[g′i(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g′i(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
For  ∈ R, let (u1, . . . , ud) be the optimal allocation of u on the d risks (X1, . . . , Xi−1, (1 +
)Xi, Xi+1, . . . , Xd):
(u1, . . . , ud) = AX1,...,Xi−1,(1+)Xi,Xi+1,...,Xd(u),
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then (u1, . . . , ud) is the unique solution in Udu of the following equation system:
E[g′i(ui − (1 + )Xi)1 {(1+)Xi>ui}1 {S+Xi≤u}] = E[g′i(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S+Xi≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Since Udu is a compact on (R+)d, we may consider a convergent subsequence (uk1 , . . . , ukd ) of
(u1, . . . , ud).
Since the penalties functions satisfy:
∃0 > 0, ∀, || < 0, E[ sup
v∈[0,u]
|g′k(v − (1 + )Xk)|] < +∞,
we use Lebesgue’s dominated convergence Theorem to get:
E[g′i(lim→0 u
k
i −Xi)1 {Xi> lim
→0
u
k
i }1 {S≤u}] = E[g
′
i(lim→0 u
k
j −Xj)1 {Xj> lim
→0
u
k
j }1 {S≤u}], ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d},
thereby (lim
→0 u
k
1 , . . . , lim
→0 u
k
d ) is a solution of Equation (1.1), because
∑d
l=1 lim→0 u
k
l = lim→0
∑d
l=1 u

l = u,
(lim
→0 u
k
1 , . . . , lim
→0 u
k
d ) ∈ Udu .
From the solution uniqueness of (1.1) in Udu , we deduce that: lim
k→∞
uki = ui for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
For all convergent subsequence of (u1, . . . , ud) the limit point is (u1, . . . , ud), we deduce that:
lim
→0(u

1, . . . , u

d) = (u1, . . . , ud).

Proposition 2.10 (Monotonicity). Under Assumption H2, and for (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , d}2, such that
gi = gj = g:
Xi ≤st Xj ⇒ ui ≤ uj.
Proof. Let (u1, . . . , uj) be the optimal allocation AX1,...,Xi,...,Xd(u), under Assumption H2, the op-
timality condition (1.1) is written as follows:
E[g′(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}] = E[g′(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}].
Now if Xi ≤st Xj, and since, x 7→ −g′(−(ui − x)+)1 {S≤u} is an increasing function on R+, then:
E[g′(ui −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}] ≤ E[g′(ui −Xi)1 {Xi>ui}1 {S≤u}].
We deduce that:
E[g′(ui −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}] ≤ E[g′(uj −Xj)1 {Xj>uj}1 {S≤u}],
and since, g′ is an increasing function, and the distributions are all continuous, that implies:
uj ≥ ui. 
By combining all the properties demonstrated in this section, we show Theorem 1.7. These
properties are therefore desirable from an economic point of view, the fact that they are satisfied
by the proposed optimal allocation implies that this allocation method may well be used for the
economic capital allocation between the different branches of a group, in terms of their actual
participation in the overall risk, taking into account both their marginal distributions and their
dependency structures with the remaining branches.
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3. Some general results in independence case
In this section we generalize the results presented in dimension 2 by Cénac et al. in the first
section of their paper [9] to higher dimension.
The results presented here give explicit forms to the optimal allocation for some specific distribu-
tions. This could be used as a benchmark to test optimization algorithms convergence.
We also get some asymptotic results, when the capital u goes to infinity. We study both the
exponential and the sub-exponential cases, and we determine the difference between their asymp-
totic behavior for exponential and Pareto distributions cases.
We consider from now on that the penalty functions are identical and equal to the severity of
local ruin gk(x) = g(x) = |x|,∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}. The optimality conditions for minimizing the
multivariate risk indicators I and J are given respectively by Equations (1.2) and (1.3). In this
section we focus on the independence case.
Remark that αi = uiu ∈ [0, 1], then when u → +∞, we may consider convergent subsequences
in the proofs below. By abuse of notation, we consider lim
u→+∞αi. In fact, we consider a convergent
subsequence and get the existence of the limit by obtaining the uniqueness of the limit point.
3.1. Independent exponentials.
Assume X1, X2, . . . , Xd are independent exponential random variables with respective parameters
0 < β1 < β2 < · · · < βd. Remark that in the particular case where β1 = β2 = · · · = βd, the optimal
allocation is u1 = · · · = ud = u/d.
Proposition 3.1 (The optimal allocation for the indicator I). The allocation minimizing the risk
indicator I is the unique solution in Udu , of the following equation system :
(3.1)
h(βiαi)− h(βjαj)−
d∑
l=1
Alh(βl)[h(αi · (βi − βl))− h(αj · (βj − βl))] = 0,∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
where h is the function defined by h(x) = exp(−u · x), and Al denotes the constants Al =
d∏
j=1,j 6=l
βj
βj − βl , l = 1, . . . , d.
Proof. If Xi ∼ E(βi) are independent exponential random variables, then S−i =
d∑
j=1;j 6=i
Xj have a
generalized Erlang distribution with parameters (β1, β2, . . . , βi−1, βi+1, . . . , βd), so we write:
P
Xi > ui, d∑
j=1
Xj ≤ u
 = P (Xi > ui)− P
Xi > ui, d∑
j=1
Xj > u

= F¯Xi(ui)− F¯Xi(u)−
∫ u
ui
F¯S−i(u− s)fXi(s)ds
= h(βiαi)− h(βi)−
d∑
l=1
Alh(βl)h(αi · (βi − βl)) +
d∑
l=1
Alh(βi)
= h(βiαi)−
d∑
l=1
Alh(βl)h(αi · (βi − βl)),
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because, F¯Xi(x) = e−βix, F¯S−i(x) =
d∑
l=1,l 6=i
(
d∏
j=1,j 6=l,j 6=i
βj
βj − βl )e
−βlx and
d∑
l=1
Al = 1.
The survival function of the generalized Erlang distribution with parameters (β1, β2, . . . , βd) is
given by ([18]):
F¯X(x) =
d∑
l=1
(
d∏
j=1,j 6=l
βj
βj − βl )e
−βlx =
d∑
l=1
Ale
−βlx.
The optimal allocation is the unique solution in Udu , of the following equation system :
P
(
Xi > ui,
d∑
k=1
Xk ≤ u
)
= P
Xj > uj, d∑
j=k
Xk ≤ u
 ,∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
which leads to (3.1). 
The resulting system is a system of nonlinear equations, which can be solved numerically.
Proposition 3.2 (The asymptotic optimal allocation for the indicator I). When the capital u goes
to infinity, the asymptotic optimal allocation satisfies:
lim
u→∞α
∗ = lim
u→∞
(
u1
u
,
u2
u
, . . . ,
ud
u
)
=

1
βi
d∑
j=1
1
βj

i=1,2,...,d
.
Proof. Equation system (3.1) is equivalent to:
(3.2) ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2, h(βiαi)[1−
d∑
l=1
Alh((1− αi)βl)] = h(βjαj)[1−
d∑
l=1
Alh((1− αj)βl)].
Firstly, remark that for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, lim
u→∞sup
ui
u
< 1 because, if this result was not satisfied
then taking if necessary i such that lim
u→∞
ui
u
= lim
u→∞αi = 1. Then for all j 6= i, limu→∞
uj
u
= lim
u→∞αj = 0,
and Equation system (1.2) cannot be satisfied.
Equation system (3.2) is equivalent to:
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2, h(βiαi − βjαj) = 1−
∑d
l=1 Alh((1− αj)βl)
1−∑dl=1Alh((1− αi)βl) ,
the right side of the last system equations tends to 1 when u tends to ∞, therefore, we deduce
that lim
u→∞h(βiαi − βjαj) = 1 and consequently:
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2, lim
u→∞αi =
βj
βi
lim
u→∞αj,
then, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}:
lim
u→∞αi =
1
βi∑d
j=1
1
βj
.

Remark 3.3. Based on the above result, we can conclude that asymptotically:
• if βi < βj then αi > αj, this means that we allocate more capital to the most risky business
line.
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• αi is a decreasing function of βi. This observation is consistent with the previous conclusion.
• αj for j 6= i is an increasing function of βi.
Proposition 3.4 (The optimal allocation for the indicator J). The allocation minimizing the risk
indicator J is the unique solution in Udu , of the following equation system :
(3.3) ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
d∑
l=1
Alh(βl)[h(αi · (βi − βl))− h(αj · (βj − βl))] = 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.1. 
Proposition 3.5 (The asymptotic optimal allocation for the indicator J). When the capital u
goes to infinity, the optimal allocation minimizing the risk indicator J is the following:
lim
u→∞
u1
u
= 1 and lim
u→∞
uj
u
= 0 ∀j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}.
Proof. Equation system (3.3) is equivalent to the following one:
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
d∑
l=1
Al · h((1− αi) · (βl − βi)) =
d∑
l=1
Al · h(αj · (βj − βl) + βl − βi).
If lim u1
u
< 1, as u goes to +∞ in the equations of the previous system for (i = 1) we get:
∀j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}, lim
u→∞
d∑
l=1
Al · h(αj · (βj − βl) + βl − β1) = A1.
The first terms of these equations can be decomposed into three parts as follows:
lim
u→∞
d∑
l=1
Al · h(αj · (βj − βl) + βl − β1) = lim
u→∞A1 · h(αj · (βj − β1))
+ lim
u→∞
j∑
l=2
Al · h(αj · (βj − βl) + βl − β1)
+ lim
u→∞
d∑
l=j+1
Al · h(αj · (βj − βl) + βl − β1),
and since, for all, j > 1, lim
u→∞
j∑
l=2
Al · h(αj · (βj − βl) + βl − β1) = 0, because βl − β1 > 0 and
βj − βl ≥ 0 for l ∈ {2, 3, . . . , j}. Moreover, lim
u→∞
d∑
l=j+1
Al · h(αj · (βj − βl) + βl − β1) = 0, because
for all l ∈ {j + 1, j + 2, . . . , d}, αj · (βj − βl) + βl − β1 = (βl − βj)(1 − αj) + βj − β1 > 0, then
lim
u→∞h(αj · (βj − β1)) = 1. We deduce that ∀j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}; limu→∞αj = o(
1
u
). This contradicts
the necessary condition: lim∑dl=1 αj
u→∞
= 1. 
3.2. Some distributions of the sub-exponential family.
In most cases of risk distributions, we cannot give explicit or semi-explicit optimal allocation
formulas, the difficulty comes from the lack of a simple form of the risks sum and its joint distri-
bution with each risk. In this section, we present explicit formulas for some distributions of the
sub-exponential family. By this way, we generalize results of [9] to higher dimension.
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We recall the sub-exponential distributions family definition, consisting in distributions of positive
support, with an distribution function that satisfies:
F ∗2(x)
F (x)
x→+∞−→ 2,
where F ∗2 is the convolution of F .
In Asmussen (2000) [2], it is proven that the sub-exponential distributions satisfy also the following
relation, for all d ∈ N∗:
F ∗d(x)
F (x)
x→+∞−→ d,
where F ∗d is the dthconvolution of F .
We shall use the following theorem proved in Cénac and al.
Theorem 3.6 (Sub-exponential distributions [9]). Let X be a random variable with sub-exponential
distribution FX , Y a random variable with support R+, independent of X, and (u, v) ∈ (R+)2, such
that:
• there exists 0 < κ1 < κ2 < 1 such that for u large enough, κ1 ≤ vu ≤ κ2,
• F¯X(y)
F¯X(x)
x→+∞= O(1), if y = Θ(x)1.
Then,
lim
u→∞
P(X ≥ v, X + Y ≥ u)
F¯X(u)
= 1.
3.2.1. The asymptotic behavior.
Propositions 3.8 and 3.10 concern the asymptotic behavior of the optimal allocation by minimizing
the indicator I, in the cases of some sub-exponential distributions.
In what follows, (u1, . . . , ud) denotes the optimal allocation of u associated to the risk indicator I.
Theorem 3.7. Let (X1, X2, . . . , Xd) be continuous positive and independent random variables.
Assume that ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2:
(1) F¯Xi(x)
x→+∞= Θ(F¯Xj(x)),
(2) F¯Xi(s)
s→+∞= o(F¯Xi(t)), if t = o(s),
then, there exist κ1 > 0 and κ2 < 1 such that,
κ1 ≤ ul
u
≤ κ2 ∀l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}.(3.4)
Note that the first condition of Theorem 3.7 is not satisfied for exponential distributions. How-
ever, Pareto distributions verify the hypothesis of Theorem 3.7.
Proof. We suppose that, ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that: ui
u
u→+∞−→ 1 or ui
u
u→+∞−→ 0, the first case implies
that foll all j 6= i, uj
u
u→+∞−→ 0, then, it is sufficient to prove that the existence of an i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
such that ui
u
u→+∞−→ 0 is impossible.
We assume the existence of i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, such that: ui
u
u→+∞−→ 0.
1For (x, y) ∈ R2+, we shall denote y = Θ(x) if there exist 0 < C1 ≤ C2 < ∞, such that for x large enough,
C1 ≤ yx ≤ C2
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Then, ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , d}\i such that lim
u→+∞
uj
u
∈]0, 1], therefore, uj u→+∞−→ +∞ and ui u→+∞= o(uj).
Using Assumptions (1) and (2), we deduce that:
F¯Xj(uj)
F¯Xi(ui)
u→+∞−→ 0.(3.5)
The optimality condition ((1.2)) can also be written for all j 6= i as follows:
F¯Xi(ui)− P (Xi > ui, S > u) = F¯Xj(uj)− P (Xi > uj, S > u) .(3.6)
That presents a trivial contradiction if ui remains bounded.
Now, assume that ui → +∞. Recall that S−i =
k=d∑
k=1,k 6=i
Xk, then:
P (Xi > ui, S > u) = P
(
Xi > ui, S
−i >
√
u, S > u
)
+ P
(
Xi > ui, S
−i <
√
u, S > u
)
.
We have:
P
(
Xi > ui, S
−i >
√
u, S > u
)
≤ P (Xi > ui)P
(
S−i >
√
u
)
u→+∞= o(F¯Xi(ui)).
Using assumption (2) and since ui = o(u),
P
(
Xi > ui, S
−i <
√
u, S > u
)
≤ F¯Xi(u−
√
u) u→+∞= o(F¯Xi(ui)).
We deduce that:
P (Xi > ui, S > u) u→+∞= o(F¯Xi(ui)).(3.7)
We remark also that:
P (Xj > uj, S > u) u→+∞= O(F¯Xj(uj))
u→+∞= o(F¯Xi(ui)).(3.8)
Equation (3.6) leads to:
1− P (Xi > ui, S > u)
F¯Xi(ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
=
F¯Xj(uj)
F¯Xi(ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
− P (Xj > uj, S > u)
F¯Xi(ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
.
Now, relations: (3.7), (3.5), and (3.8), imply that T1, T2, and T3, go to zero, and this is a contra-
diction. 
Proposition 3.8. Let X1, . . . , Xd be continuous, positive and independent random variables such
that the support of the density of (Xi, S) is (R+)2. Let (u1, . . . , ud) be the optimal allocation of u
associated to the risk indicator I. We assume:
(1) there exist 0 < κ1 < κ2 < 1 such that for all i = 1, . . . , d and for all u ∈ R+,
κ1 ≤ ui
u
≤ κ2,
(2) for all i = 1, . . . , d, if y = y(x) is such that
0 < lim inf
x→∞
y
x
≤ lim sup
x→∞
y
x
< 1
then
FXi(x)
FXi(y)
x→∞−→ 0.
Then, for all i, j = 1, . . . , d,
FXi(ui)
FXj(uj)
u→∞−→ 1.
18
Assumptions of Proposition 3.8 are satisfied for distributions of exponential type (see remark (3.9)
below). Its application gives another proof to Proposition 3.2. In contrast, Proposition 3.8 cannot
be used for Pareto distributions.
Proof. Following the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.7, take 0 < γ < 1− κ2,
P(Xi > ui, S > u) = P(Xi > ui, S−i > γu, S > u) + P(Xi > ui, S−i > γu, S > u).
As before,
P(Xi > ui, S−i > γu, S > u) ≤ P(Xi > ui)P(S−i > γu) u→+∞= o(FXi(ui)).
On the other hand,
P(Xi > ui, S−i > γu, S > u) ≤ P(Xi > u− γu)
= FXi((1− γ)u) u→+∞= o(FXi(ui))
because 0 < κ11− γ ≤
ui
(1− γ)u ≤
κ2
1− γ < 1.
So that, P(Xi > ui, S > u) u→+∞= o(FXi(ui)) and the same computation gives P(Xj > uj, S >
u) u→+∞= o(FXj(uj)). Now, ui and uj satisfy Equation (1) and thus,
1 + o(1) u→+∞=
FXj(uj)
FXi(ui)
+ o(1)
FXj(uj)
FXi(ui)
.
This implies that FXj (uj)
FXi (ui)
is bounded from above and thus
FXj(uj)
FXi(ui)
u→+∞= 1 + o(1).

Remark 3.9. We remark that the hypothesis of Proposition 3.8 are satisfied for distribution of
exponential type, that is distributions verifying:
F¯Xi(x) = Θ(e−µix).
Indeed, in this case, we have 0 < lim ui
u
≤ lim ui
u
< 1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. In fact, if ui u→+∞= o(u),
then, ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , d}\{i} such that uj
u
→ κ ∈]0, 1], so ui u→+∞= o(uj).
Since µi, µj > 0, µiui u→+∞= o(µjuj). And as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, we get:
P (Xi > ui, S > u) u→+∞= o(F¯Xi(ui))
and,
P (Xj > uj, S > u) u→+∞= o(F¯Xj(uj)).
From the optimality condition,
F¯Xi(ui)
e−µiui
− P (Xi > ui, S > u)
e−µiui︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
=
F¯Xj(uj)
e−µiui︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
− P (Xj > uj, S > u)
e−µiui︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
,
which is absurd because as u→ +∞:
• F¯Xi(ui) = Θ(e−µiui),
• T1 = o(1),
• T2 = F¯Xj (uj)e−µjuj e−µjuj+µiui → 0, since µiui = o(µjuj),
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• and T3 = o(1)e−µjuj+µiui → 0.
Proposition 3.10 (The asymptotic optimal allocation for the indicator I). Under the same con-
ditions of Theorem 3.7, and if, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, FXi is a sub-exponential distribution, that
verifies:
F¯Xi(y)
F¯Xi(x)
x→+∞= O(1), for 0 < κ1 ≤ y
x
≤ κ2 < 1.
Then, by minimizing the I indicator, ui and uj satisfy:
(3.9) F¯Xi(ui)− F¯Xi(u) u→+∞= F¯Xj(uj)− F¯Xj(u) + o(F¯Xi(u)).
Proposition 3.10 is applicable in the case of Pareto distributions. So, we will use it for deter-
mining the optimal asymptotic allocation, for independent risks of Pareto distributions in the next
subsection.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is a direct application of Theorems 3.6 and 3.7. 
Now, we focus on the asymptotic optimal allocation by minimizing the risk indicator J , and we
study the case of sub-exponential distribution family.
Proposition 3.11 (The asymptotic optimal allocation for the indicator J). Let (X1, X2, . . . , Xd)
be continuous positive and independent random variables, such that, there exist i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
with a sub-exponential distribution, the optimal capital allocation by minimizing the J indicator
(u1, . . . , ud) verifies, for all j 6= i:
lim
u→∞
P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≥ u)
F¯Xi(u)
= 1.
Proof. The solution to (1.3) satisfies :
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, P (Xi > ui, S ≥ u)
P (Xi > u)
= P (Xj > uj, S ≥ u))
P (Xi > u)
.
When u goes to +∞, and using Theorem 3.6, we obtain Proposition 3.11. 
3.2.2. application to Pareto independent distributions.
We consider d independent random variables {X1, X2, . . . , Xd} of Pareto distributions, with param-
eters (a, bi){i=1,2,...,d} respectively, such that b1 > b2 > · · · > bd > 0. Therefore, these distributions
will be characterized by densities and survival functions of the following forms:
fXi(x) =
a
bi
(
1 + x
bi
)−a−1
,
and
F¯Xi(x) =
(
1 + x
bi
)−a
.
Proposition 3.12 (The asymptotic optimal allocation minimizing I). Asymptotically, the unique
solution to (1.2) satisfies:
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
 limu→∞αi
bi
−a −
 limu→∞αj
bj
−a = ( 1
bi
)−a
−
(
1
bj
)−a
.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 3.10. 
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Proposition 3.13 (The asymptotic optimal allocation minimizing J). The unique solution to (1.3)
satisfies:
lim
u→∞α1 = 1 et limu→∞αi = 0,∀i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}.
Proof. We suppose that, ∃ ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that 0 < lim
u→∞αj < 1.
From Theorem 3.6 :
lim
u→∞
P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≥ u)
F¯Xj(u)
= 1.
On the other hand, and applying Proposition 3.11 in the Pareto distributions case, we get for
i ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {j}:
P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≥ u)
F¯Xj(u)
= P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≥ u)
F¯Xi(u)
· F¯Xi(u)
F¯Xj(u)
u→+∞∼ F¯Xi(u)
F¯Xj(u)
=
1 + ubi
1 + u
bj
−a ,
then, for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} \ {j}:
lim
u→∞
P(Xj ≥ uj, S ≥ u)
F¯Xj(u)
=
(
bj
bi
)−a
6= 1.
That is absurd. We deduce that ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}:
lim
u→∞αi ∈ {0, 1},
and since ∑di=1 αi = 1, then, there is a unique i such that limu→∞αi = 1 and for all j 6= i limu→∞αj = 0.
Now, and using the stochastic dominance order, we have Xd 4st · · · 4st X2 4st X1, because
b1 > b2 > · · · > bd. Finally, since the optimal capital allocation satisfies the monotonicity property,
we deduce that:
max
i∈{1,2,...,d}
{ lim
u→∞αi} = limu→∞α1 = 1.

3.3. Comparison between the asymptotic behaviors in exponential and sub-exponential
cases. Let us consider the following risk indicator:
Iloc(u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)1 {Xk>uk}
)
=
d∑
k=1
E
(
(Xk − uk)+
)
.
With this indicator, the impact of each branch on the group is not taken into account. This
indicator thus takes only local effects into account. If, for any k = 1, . . . , d, the random vector
(Xk, S) admits a density whose support contains [0, u]2, then the optimality condition associated
to Iloc gives:
P(Xi > ui) = P(Xj > uj).
We remark that this corresponds to the asymptotic result for indicator I of Proposition 3.8, where
FXj (uj)
FXi (ui)
u→+∞= 1 + o(1). In other words, in the case of exponential type and independent risks,
the group effect is negligible. This behavior is also clear in Proposition 3.2, where we found the
asymptotic capital allocation for I for independent exponential distributions as:
ui =
1
βi∑d
j=1
1
βj
u, for all i = 1, . . . , d,
as for Iloc.
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Proposition 3.10 shows that for independent sub-exponential distributions the asymptotic be-
havior is different. Indeed, in Equation (3.9), the terms F¯Xi(u) and F¯Xj(u) lead to take into
account the group effect. In the Pareto distributions case as example, recall that Proposition 3.12
gives that the asymptotic behavior of the optimal allocation for I is described by : limu→∞αi
bi
−a −
 limu→∞αj
bj
−a = ( 1
bi
)−a
−
(
1
bj
)−a
,
whereas the optimal allocation for Iloc for independent Pareto distributions is given by αi = bi∑d
l=1 bl
,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
For optimal allocation by minimizing the J indicator, the asymptotic behavior is identical for
the two families of distributions, the riskiest branch is considered as first responsible for the overall
ruin, and thus, the optimal solution is to allocate the entire capital u to this business line.
4. The impact of the dependence structure
In this section, we focus on the impact of the dependence structure on the optimal allocation.
We study at first the impact of mixture exponential-gamma to construct a Pareto distribution,
compared to the independence case presented in the previous section, then we analyze the optimal
allocation composition in the case of comonotonic risks. The last sub-section is devoted to the
study of the impact of the dependence nature on the optimal allocation, using some bivariate
models with copulas.
4.1. Correlated Pareto.
Let (X1, . . . , Xd) be a mixture of exponential distributions such that for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
Xi ∼ E(βiθ), with (β1 < β2 · · · < βd), and θ ∼ Γ(a, b). Therefore, Xi have survival functions of the
form:
F¯Xi(x) =
∫ ∞
0
F¯Xi|Θ=θfΘ(θ)dθ =
∫ ∞
0
e−βiθxfΘ(θ)dθ =
(
1 + βix
b
)−a
,
consequently, Xi have Pareto distribution of parameters
(
a, b
βi
)
. They are conditionally indepen-
dents. So, the idea is conditioning on the random variable θ and then integrate the formulas found
for the case of independent exponential distributions. This model has been studied in e.g.[20, 26].
Proposition 4.1 (The optimal allocation for the indicator I). The optimal allocation minimizing
the multivariate risk indicator I is the unique solution in Udu , of the following equation system :
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
(4.1) s(βiαi)− s(βjαj)−
d∑
l=1
Al[s(αiβi + (1− αi)βl))− s(αjβj + (1− αj)βl))] = 0,
where s is the function defined by s(x) = (1 + xu
b
)−a and αi = uiu for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Proof. It suffices to integrate Equation system (3.1), multiplied by the density function of θ. 
Proposition 4.2 (The asymptotic optimal allocation for the indicator I). When the capital u goes
to infinity, the optimal allocation by minimization of the risk indicator I is the unique solution in
Udu of the following equation system:
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
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(4.2) (βiαi)−a − (βjαj)−a −
d∑
l=1
Al[(αiβi + (1− αi)βl)−a − (αjβj + (1− αj)βl)−a] = 0.
Proof. We divide Equation system (4.1) by s(1), and let u go to +∞ to get Equation system (4.2).

Proposition 4.2 shows the impact of the dependence related to the mixture. Indeed, in the case
of independent Pareto distributions, of parameters
(
a, b
βi
)
i=1,...,d
, the asymptotic optimal allocation
for the indicator I is given by Proposition 3.12 as the solution of the equation system:
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2, (βiαi)−a − (βjαj)−a = (βi)−a − (βj)−a .
Each equation in this system depends only on two risks, unlike the mixture case, where the
equations of Equation system (4.2), depend on all the risks.
Proposition 4.3 (The optimal allocation for the indicator J). The optimal allocation minimizing
the multivariate risk indicator J is the unique solution in Udu , of the following equation system :
(4.3) ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
d∑
l=1
Al[s(αiβi + (1− αi)βl))− s(αjβj + (1− αj)βl))] = 0.
Proof. It suffices to integrate Equation system (3.3), multiplied by the density function of θ. 
Proposition 4.4 (The asymptotic optimal allocation for the indicator J). When the capital u goes
to infinity, the optimal allocation by minimization of the risk indicator J , is the unique solution in
Udu of the following equation system:
(4.4) ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}2,
d∑
l=1
Al[(αiβi + (1− αi)βl)−a − (αjβj + (1− αj)βl)−a] = 0.
Proof. we divide Equation system (4.3) by s(1), and we let u fo to +∞ to get Equation system (4.4).

Proposition 4.4 shows that for the indicator J , the asymptotic behaviour of the optimal capital
allocation takes into account the mixture effect. In fact, for independent Pareto distributions, we
have proved in Proposition 3.13, that we allocate the entire capital u to the riskiest branch X1,
while the asymptotic optimal allocation in the correlated Pareto distributions case is the solution
of Equation system (4.4).
4.2. Comonotonic risks.
A vector of random variables (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) is comonotonic if and only if there exists a random
variable Y and non decreasing functions ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such that:
(X1, . . . , Xn) =d (ϕ1(Y ), . . . , ϕn(Y )).
Note that the joint distribution function of comonotonic random variables corresponds to the upper
Fréchet bound.
In the case where the risks X1,. . . ,Xd are comonotonic, we can give explicit formulas for the
optimal allocation minimizing the multivariate risk indicators I and J , and for some risk models.
For that, we use the existence of an uniform random variable U such that: Xi = F−1Xi (U) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and S = ∑di=1 F−1Xi (U) = ϕ(U), where ϕ(t) = ∑di=1 F−1Xi (t), ϕ is a non decreasing
function.
The main result of this section is given below.
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Proposition 4.5. Let X1,. . . ,Xd be comonotonic risks, with increasing distribution functions and
support containing [0, u]. The optimal allocations for indicators I and J coincide, they are given
by: (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ Udu and
FXi(ui) = FXj(uj) ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , d.
Proof. Let us denote: wi = FXi(ui), v = ϕ−1(u), Mi = max(wi, v). The indicators I and J may
be rewritten for (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ Udu :
I(u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
i=1
E
(
(F−1Xi (U)− ui)1{U≥wi, U≤v}
)
J(u1, . . . , ud) =
d∑
i=1
E
(
(F−1Xi (U)− ui)1{U≥Mi}
)
.
We remark that since (u1, . . . , ud) ∈ Udu , and FXi is strictly increasing for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, we
cannot have that wi < v for all i, so that, I is not trivially equal to 0. We use Lagrange multiplier
to get that the minimum of I and J are reached in Udu respectively for:
• P(U ≥ wi, U ≤ v) = P(U ≥ wj, U ≤ v), for i, j = 1, . . . , d,
• P(U ≥Mi) = P(U ≥Mj), for i, j = 1, . . . , d.
These equality are acheaved if and only if wi = wj = v or in other words if FXi(ui) = FXj(uj). We
remark that the minimum of I is then 0. 
The following three corollaries are direct applications of Proposition 4.5 to some particular cases.
Corollary 4.6 (Comonotonic exponential model). For comonotonic risks of exponential distribu-
tions Xi ∼ exp(βi), the optimal allocation by minimization of the two risk indicators is:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ui = 1/βi∑d
j=1 1/βj
u.
Corollary 4.7 (Comonotonic log-normal model). For comonotonic risks of log-normal distribu-
tions Xi ∼ LN(µi, σ), the optimal allocation by minimization of the two risk indicators is:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ui = exp(µi)∑d
l=1 exp(µl)
u.
Corollary 4.8 (Comonotonic Pareto model). For comonotonic risks of Pareto distributions of the
same shape parameter α: Xi ∼ Pa(α, λi), the optimal allocation by minimization of the two risk
indicators is:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ui = λi∑d
l=1 λl
u.
4.3. The dependence impact with some copulas models.
In this section, we study the impact of the dependence on the optimal capital allocation using
some copulas (see Nelsen [19] for review on copulas). The idea is to find the optimal allocation as
function of the copula parameters in each case.
4.3.1. FGM Bivariate Model.
Let X1 and X2 be two risks of marginal exponential distributions Xi ∼ exp(βi) and FGM bivariate
dependence structure with −1 ≤ θ ≤ 1 as parameter (see Nelsen [19],Example 3.12., section 3.2.5).
We assume that β1 < β2/2.
In this case, the copula Pearson correlation coefficient is given by ρP = θ4 , and the bivariate
distribution function is:
FX1,X2(x1, x2) = (1− e−β1x1)(1− e−β2x2) + θ(1− e−β1x1)(1− e−β2x2)e−β1x1e−β2x2 .
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Proposition 4.9 (The optimal capital allocation for the indicator I in the FGM Model). For the
indicator I, the optimal allocation of a capital u is given by (βu, (1 − β)u) such that β = u1/u is
the unique solution in [0, 1] of the following equation:
(1 + 2θ)(h(β)− h(α− αβ)) + 2θ(h(2β)− h(2α− 2αβ))
+(1 + θ)h(α + β − αβ) + θh(2α + 2β − 2αβ)−θh(α + 2β − αβ)− θh(2α + β − 2αβ)
= 1 + θ
α− 1(h(α) + αh(1)) +
θ
α− 1(h(2α) + αh(2))−
θ
α− 2(2h(α) + αh(2))−
θ
2α− 1(h(2α) + 2αh(1))
where, h is the function h(x) = exp(−β1ux),and α = β2/β1.
Remark 4.10. In the case of θ = 0, we find exactly Equation (3.1) given by Proposition 3.1 for the
independent exponential distributions model.
Equation (4.9) gives the behavior of the optimal allocation with respect to θ. It may be solved
numerically.
Figure 1 presents an illustration of the optimal allocation variation with respect to the dependence
parameter of the FGM copula.
Figure 1. β as a function of θ. Case : β1 = 0.05, β2 = 0.25 , and u = 50
We remark that β is an increasing function of θ, this can be verified analytically using the
implicit function theorem.
4.3.2. Marshall-Olkin Model.
Let Yi ∼ exp(λi), with i = 0, 1, 2 be three independent random variables.
We construct two random variables with common shock: Xi = min(Yi, Y0) for i = 1, 2. Xi’s have
exponential marginal distributions of parameters βi = λi + λ0 (see e.g. Nelsen [19] section 3.1.1.).
This dependence construction model have as Pearson correlation coefficient ρP = λ0λ0+λ1+λ2 .
The joint distribution function is given by:
F¯X1,X2(x1, x2) = P(X1 > x1, X2 > x2) = P(Y1 > x1, Y2 > x2, Y0 > max(x1, x2))
= e−λ1x1e−λ2x2e−λ0 max(x1,x2)
= e−(λ0+λ1)x1e−(λ0+λ2)x2eλ0 min(x1,x2)
= F¯X1(x1)F¯X2(x2)eλ0 min(x1,x2),
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and the joint density function is the following:
fX1,X2(x1, x2) =

f 1X1,X2(x1, x2) = β1e−β1x1(β2 − λ0)e−(β2−λ0)x2 si x1 > x2
f 2X1,X2(x1, x2) = (β1 − λ0)e−(β1−λ0)x1β2e−β2x2 si x1 < x2
f 0X1,X2(x1, x2) = λ0e−β1xe−β2xeλ0x si x1 = x2 = x
.
Proposition 4.11 (The optimal capital allocation for the indicator I in the Marshall-Olkin
Model). We suppose that λ1 < λ2. The optimal allocation of a capital u minimizing the indicator
I is given by (βu, (1 − β)u), such that β = u1/u is the unique solution in [0, 1] of the following
equation:
g(β2(1− β))− g(β1β) + β1
β1 − λ2 g((β1 − λ2)β + λ2) +
λ2
β1 − λ2 g((λ2 − β1)(1− β) + β1)
− λ1
λ1 − β2 g(β2) =
λ2
β1 − λ2 g(β1) + g(λs/2)[
β1
β1 − λ2 −
λ1
λ1 − β2 ],
where, λs = λ0 + λ1 + λ2, and g is the function g(x) = exp(−ux).
Remark 4.12. In the case of : λ0 = 0 which is the independence case, we find exactly Equation (3.1)
given by Proposition 3.1.
We can consider λ0 as a dependence parameter in this model. Figure 2 presents an illustration
of the variation of β as a function of λ0.
Figure 2. β as a function of λ0 : β1 = 0.05, β2 = 0.25 and u = 50.
One can notice that β is a decreasing function of λ0, that is coherent with the increase of β as
function of α = β2
β1
= λ2+λ0
λ1+λ0 demonstrated in [9] in the independence case, since the two risks are
independent, conditionally to Y0.
Conclusion
Compared to conventional capital allocation methods, the main advantage of the capital alloca-
tion by minimizing multivariate risk indicators, is that we do not need to choose a univariate risk
measure. It seems more coherent in a multivariate framework to use directly a multivariate risk
indicator, not only for risk measurement, but also for capital allocation.
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In this article, we have shown that this capital allocation method can be considered as coherent
from an economic point of view. We also proved, for some specific models, that it fully takes into
account the dependence between different risks. This method also illustrates the importance of the
risky business portfolio choice and its impact on the management of the overall company capital.
We have studied the allocation asymptotic behaviour based on the level of the group capital.
It has enabled us to build an idea of the capital level impact on the sensitivity of its allocation
between branches. The comparison between the asymptotic optimal allocation in the case of sub-
exponential and exponential distributions, serves to underscore the impact of the risks nature on
the behavior of the allocation for a very large capital.
This method can be developed if one can construct some broader sets of multivariate risk indi-
cators as this is the case for univariate risk measures.
Finally, the choice of a capital allocation method remains a complex and crucial exercise because
some methods may be better suited to deal with specific issues, others can lead to dangerously
wrong financial decisions. In the case of the proposed optimal capital allocation, the risk manage-
ment is at the heart of the allocation process, and the company can allocate its capital and reduces
its overall risk at the same time. Its risk aversion is reflected by the choice of the multivariate
risk indicator to minimize. That is why we think that from risk management point of view, this
method can be considered as more flexible.
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Appendix A. Some Lemmas and Proofs
A.1. Proposition 4.9.
Proof. The bivariate density function is the following:
fX1,X2(x1, x2) = (1 + θ)f(x1, x2, β1, β2) + θf(x1, x2, 2β1, 2β2)
− θf(x1, x2, 2β1, β2)− θf(x1, x2, β1, 2β2)fX1,X2(x1, x2),
where f is the function f(x, t, a, b) = abe−(a−b)xe−bt.
We use the equality: fX1,S=Xi+X2(x1, s) = fX1,X2(x1, s − x1)1 {s≥x1} for all s ≥ x1, to find the
expression of FX1,S(x1, s), using a double integration:
FX1,S(x1, s) =
∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
fX1,X2(x, t− x)1 {t≥x}dxdt =
∫ x1
0
∫ s
x
fX1,X2(x, t− x)dtdx
= (1 + θ)F (x1, s, β1, β2) + θF (x1, s, 2β1, 2β2)− θF (x1, s, 2β1, β2)− θF (x1, s, β1, 2β2),
where F is the following function:
F (x1, s, a, b) =
∫ x1
0
∫ s
x
f(x, t, a, b)dtdx = 1− e−ax1 + a
b− ae
−bs − a
b− ae
−bs+(b−a)x1 .
The same way and by the symmetry of the FGM model:
FX2,S(x2, s) = (1 + θ)F (x2, s, β2, β1) + θF (x2, s, 2β2, 2β1)− θF (x2, s, 2β2, β1)− θF (x2, s, β2, 2β1).
Using P(Xi > ui, S ≤ u) = P(S ≤ u) − P(Xi ≤ ui, S ≤ u), the optimal allocation is the
unique solution in U2u of the equation: FX1,S(u1, u) = FX2,S(u2, u). Then, the optimal allocation is
determined by β the solution of the equation: FX1,S(βu, u) = FX2,S((1− β)u, u).
Since,
FX1,S(βu, u) = 1 + 4θ − (1 + 2θ)h(β)− 2θh(2β)
+ (1 + θ) 1
α− 1[h(α)− h(α + β − αβ)] + θ
1
α− 1[h(2α)− h(2α + 2β − 2αβ)]
− θ 2
α− 2[h(α)− h(α + 2β − αβ)]− θ
1
2α− 1[h(2α)− h(2α + β − 2αβ)],
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and,
FX2,S((1− β)u, u) = 1 + 4θ − (1 + 2θ)h(α(1− β))− 2θh(2α(1− β))
+ (1 + θ) α1− α [h(1)− h(α + β − αβ)] + θ
α
1− α [h(2)− h(2α + 2β − 2αβ)]
− θ 2α1− 2α [h(1)− h(2α + β − 2αβ)]− θ
α
2− α [h(2)− h(α + 2β − αβ)],
we deduce from that the equation presented in the proposition 4.9. 
A.2. Proposition 4.11.
Proof. The joint distribution function is given by:
FX1,S(x1, s) =
∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
fX1,S(x, t− x)1 {t>x}dxdt
=
∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)1 {2x>t>x}dxdt+
∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 2X1,S(x, t− x)1 {t>2x}dxdt
+
∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 0X1,S(x, t− x)1 {t=2x}dxdt.
we distinguish between two cases:
Case s > 2x1: in this case,∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)1 {2x>t>x}dxdt =
∫ s
2x1
∫ x1
0
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)1 {2x>t>x}dxdt
+
∫ 2x1
0
∫ x1
0
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)1 {2x>t>x}dxdt
=
∫ 2x1
0
∫ x1
0
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)1 {2x>t>x}dxdt
=
∫ 2x1
0
∫ min(x1,t)
t/2
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)dxdt
=
∫ x1
0
∫ t
t/2
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)dxdt+
∫ 2x1
x1
∫ x1
t/2
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)dxdt,
and,∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 2X1,S(x, t− x)1 {t>2x}dxdt =
∫ x1
0
∫ s
0
f 2X1,S(x, t− x)1 {t>2x}dtdx =
∫ x1
0
∫ s
2x
f 2X1,S(x, t− x)dtdx,
and, ∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 0X1,S(x, t− x)1 {t=2x}dxdt =
λ0
λ0 + λ1 + λ2
(1− e−(λ0+λ1+λ2)x1),
then, we deduce the explicit expression of FX1,S(x1, s):
FX1,S(x1, s) =
2β1λ2
(β1 − λ2)(β1 + λ2)(1− e
−(β1+λ2)x1)− λ2
β1 − λ2 (1− e
−β1x1)− β1
β1 − λ2 (e
−β1x1 − e−(β1+λ2)x1)
+ λ1
λ1 + β2
(1− e−(λ1+β2)x1)− λ1
λ1 − β2 e
−β2s + λ1
λ1 − β2 e
−(λ1−β2)x1−β2s
+ λ0
λ0 + λ1 + λ2
(1− e−(λ0+λ1+λ2)x1).
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Case 2x1 > s > x1 :∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)1 {2x>t>x}dxdt =
∫ s
0
∫ min(x1,t)
t/2
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)dxdt
=
∫ x1
0
∫ t
t/2
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)dxdt+
∫ s
x1
∫ x1
t/2
f 1X1,S(x, t− x)dxdt,
and, ∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 2X1,S(x, t− x)1 {t>2x}dxdt =
∫ s
0
∫ t/2
0
f 2X1,S(x, t− x)dxdt,
and, ∫ s
0
∫ x1
0
f 0X1,S(x, t− x)1 {t=2x}dxdt =
λ0
λ0 + λ1 + λ2
(1− e−(λ0+λ1+λ2)s/2),
then, we deduce also in this case, the explicit expression of FX1,S(x1, s):
FX1,S(x1, s) =
2β1λ2
(β1 − λ2)(β1 + λ2)(1− e
−(β1+λ2)s/2)− λ2
β1 − λ2 (1− e
−β1x1)
− β1
β1 − λ2 (e
−β1x1 − e−(β1−λ2)x1−λ2s) + λ1
λ1 − β2 (1− e
−β2s)
− 2λ1β2(λ1 − β2)(λ1 + β2)(1− e
−(λ1+β2)s/2) + λ0
λ0 + λ1 + λ2
(1− e−(λ0+λ1+λ2)s/2).
We remark that λ0 + λ1 + λ2 = λ1 + β2 = λ2 + β1, and we suppose that λ1 > λ2. Using the
monotony property, we deduce that 1 > β > 1/2, then 2βu > u > βu. So, for u1 = βu, and
g(x) = exp(−xu):
FX1,S(βu, u) = 1−g(β1β)−
λ1
λ1 − β2 g(β2)+
β1
β1 − λ2 g((β1−λ2)β+λ2)+g(λs/2)[
λ1
λ1 − β2 −
β1
β1 − λ2 ],
and,
FX2,S((1− β)u, u) = 1− g(β2(1− β) +
λ2
λ2 − β1 [g((λ2 − β1)(1− β) + β1)− g(β1)].
That is sufficient to get 4.11. 
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